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Judicial Wandering Through a

Legislative Maze: Application of
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act

and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
to Child Custody Determinations
Glanzner v. State, Departmentof Social Services'
I. INTRODUCTION
The area of child custody detefninations has historically been plagued by
the problem of conflicting decrees among alternate forums. The possibility
of a conflicting decree provides an incentive for parents to kidnap their
children and move them to a new forum in hopes of gaining custody.'
Conflicting decrees disrupt the lives of countless children and subject children
to unnecessary interstate struggles Child custody determinations are unique
in that they intimately affect the lives of innocent children caught in the web
of parental discord.
Originally, state legislatures responded to this dilemma by adopting the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act4 (UCCJA) in an attempt to
standardize and self-regulate jurisdiction over child custody determinations.5
While states could mandate guidelines for exercising initial jurisdiction, the
need for uniformity of interstate enforcement of initial custody decrees still
created problems. 6 Congress responded by promulgating the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA),7 a federal statute governing full faith and
credit for custody determinations.
The UCCJA and PKPA establish a maze of procedural hurdles over
which a court must jump to determine the proper forum in which to consider
child custody issues. The Acts are complex and interrelated. For this reason,

1. 835 S.W.2d 386 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
2. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 180 (1988).
3. Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody. Initial Jurisdiction and Continuing
JurisdictionUnder the UCCJA, 14 FAm. L.Q. 203, 214 (1981).
4. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.440-.550 (1986); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 5150-5174 (West

1983).
5. Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 214.
6. Barbara A. Atwood, ChildCustodyJurisdictionandTerritoriality,52 OIo ST. L.L 369,
391 (1991).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1988). This Section is officially entitled "Full Faith and Credit
Given to Child Custody Determinations."
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many courts, including the Glanzner court, have misapplied them and
therefore have failed to accomodate the policy considerations that initially
gave rise to the Acts.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Suzanne and Keith Glanzner separated in October of 1985 after four
years of marriage. 8 While Keith served in the military in Okinawa, Japan, the
family spent nearly seventeen months of those four years apart, including their
only son's first year.9 During Keith's service in Okinawa, Suzanne and
Bradley, their son, lived in St. Louis with Keith's parents." In November
of 1983 Keith returned from Japan and was stationed in California, where his
family joined him." The Glanzners returned as a family to St. Louis in
January, 1985.12 Less than a year after their move to Missouri, Suzanne took
Bradley back to California, leaving Keith in Missouri. 3
Thereafter, the family's disputes became legal battles. Suzanne filed in
California for legal separation and custody of Bradley on December 18,
1985.14 Subsequent to Suzanne's filing in California, Keith filed for
dissolution in St. Louis on January 10, 1986.' s Three days later, on January
13, Keith was personally served in Missouri with a summons issued from
California. 6 He responded by filing a motion to quash service on the
ground that California should not exercise jurisdiction over the child custody
issue. 7 However, he never officially asserted that California lacked personal
jurisdiction over him. 8 The California trial court held a hearing on Keith's
motion to quash and officially assumed jurisdiction over the child custody
issue under California's version of the UCCJA. 9 During this hearing, the

8. Glanzner, 835 S.W.2d at 388.
9. Id. at 387.
10. Id. at 388.

11. Id. at 387.
12. Id. at 388.
13. Id.
14. Id.

15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id at 389; see infra note 157 (discussing the personal jurisdiction issue).
19. Glanzner, 835 S.W.2d at 388. Under both the Missouri and California versions of the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), jurisdiction exists in the state which is the

child's home state (the state in which the child lived for six months prior to the custody
proceedings) or in a state with which the child has a "significant connection" and "[t]here is
available ... substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection,
training, and personal relationships." CAL. CIV. CODE § 5152(1)(a)-(b) (West 1983); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 452.450.1(1)(b), .1(2)(b) (1986). The California court acknowledged that inthe instant
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss2/6
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California trial judge consulted a St. Louis County Circuit trial judge' via
telephone because the jurisdictional dispute was between California and
Missouri.2' Several weeks following California's official assumption of
jurisdiction, Suzanne was personally served in California pursuant to the
Missouri dissolution action filed by Keith in January of 1986.'
The California court continued to exercise jurisdiction despite Missouri's
concurrent assertion of jurisdiction over the child custody issue. On August
12, 1986, the California court entered an order, pending trial, giving custody
to Suzanne and imposing liability on Keith for child and spousal support.'
The Missouri court entered a default decree of dissolution on September 5,
1986.24 The Missouri court granted Keith custody of his son, Bradley, and
Thereafter, the case went to trial in
gave Suzanne visitation rights.'
California, and a California court dissolved the marriage on November 3,

1986.26 The court granted custody of Bradley to Suzanne and awarded
reasonable visitation rights to Keith within California.27

Throughout these proceedings and until the summer of 1991, Suzanne
retained physical custody of Bradley.28 In the summer of 1991, Keith's
parents visited Suzanne and Bradley in California.29 Suzanne then allowed
Bradley to spend some time with his grandparents in St. Louis because they
assured her that Bradley would be returned to California on September 1,
1991.30 However, their assurance was misleading. Bradley was not returned
to Suzanne on September 1, 1991, but remained in St. Louis." In an attempt

case, Missouri was the home state, but assumed jurisdiction under the second clause requiring
"significant connection" and availability of "substantial evidence." Glanznr,835 S.W.2dat388.
20. Judge Ninian M. Edwards was consulted. Glanzner, 835 S.W.2d at 388 n.2.
21. Id. at 388. Both the Missouri and California versions of the UCCJA authorize the court
deciding the jurisdiction issue to communicate with courts of other states before determining
whether or not exercise of jurisdiction is proper. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5156(4) (West 1983); Mo.
Rnv. STAT.

§ 452.470.3 (1986).

22. Glanzner, 835 S.W.2d at 388.
23. The court also granted Keith visitation rights within California. IR
24. Id Suzanne objected to jurisdiction in Missouri and filed a special appearance to
contest it. Her objection to jurisdiction was overruled by the St. Louis County Court, which was
fully aware of the California court's assumption ofjurisdiction over the child custody issue and
the pending action therein. Id
25. Id. At the time of the Missouri decree, California had already entered its ruling
"pending trial." Id However, the California court did not enter its final ruling dissolving the
marriage and granting custody to Suzanne until November 3, 1986. Id
26. Id
27. Id.
28. Id
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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to regain custody of Bradley, Suzanne filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in Missouri on September 13, 1991.32 A temporary order returning
custody to Suzanne was issued pending Missouri's determination of proper
custody in the instant case 3
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, consolidated the child
custody jurisdiction issue and a pending Missouri appeal concerning Suzanne's
demand for child and spousal support. 4 Judge Grimm, writing for the court,
relied on the PKPA to deny Suzanne's writ of habeas corpus to enforce the
California court's custody and child support orders. 5 The California oider
for spousal support, however, was enforced.36 The court decided the case
under the PKPA, determining that the California order was not entitled to
enforcement.3 According to the Glanzner court, when contradictory child
custody orders are made in two states exercising jurisdiction over the same
issue, the PKPA should be applied in place of the UCCJA to determine which
court may properly exercise jurisdiction."
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The UCCJA and the PKPA are the primary statutory provisions for
determining jurisdiction in child custody proceedings. The UCCJA is a model
act that has been adopted with some variation by all fifty states.39 It serves
as the primary authority for determining initial jurisdiction over child custody
issues. The PKPA is a federal act that mandates that interstate full faith and
credit be given to initial custody determinations rendered in conformity with
the PKPA.4" A skeletal framework of the interrelationship between the
UCCJA and PKPA will aid understanding of a close analysis of the Acts.
Child custody determinations are unique in that they are never fully
settled until a child is no longer subject to parental guardianship. It is

32. Id.
33. Id. at 388-89.
34. The consolidated issue regarded the state's appeal of the trial court's reversal of a

Department of Social Services order demanding Keith pay spousal and child support arrearage
of $11,118. Id. at 387. The trial court based its reversal on a finding that California lacked
jurisdiction to enter either a custody or support order. Id. at 389.
35. Id. at 393.
36. Id at 394. The PKPA is silent on the issue of spousal support. The court reasoned that
California's order on this issue was binding because the father had been personally served in
California and had sufficient contacts with the state. Id. at 393-94.
37. Id. at 389-90.
38. Id. at 393.
39. Mark H. Kruger, Jurisdiction Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 44 J.
Mo. B. 467, 470 (1988).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1988).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss2/6
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therefore necessary that a nationwide system exist to determine initial
jurisdiction, as well as jurisdiction over modification and enforcement of the
initial decree. The UCCJA and PKPA, working together, provide just that.
When a child custody issue arises, the first determination is which court
may decide the issue according to state law (the UCCJA). If a court in which
a child custody action is originally brought has jurisdiction pursuant to its
UCCJA, it may render a custody determination.4' The state rendering the
initial custody decree has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the issue until
all litigants move from that state42 or that state voluntarily declines further
exercise of jurisdiction.43 If the same issue is brought in a court of another
state, most states' enactments of the UCCJA require the second state to
enforce the custody decree of the first state" and forbid modification.45
When a subsequent action is brought in another state, it is proper to alply the
PKPA to determine if interstate full faith and credit for the initial decree is
mandated.46
There are two requirements that must be fulfilled for a decree to be
entitled to full faith and credit under the PKPA.47 The first requirement is
that jurisdiction must have been proper in the state where the initial decree
was rendered. 48 The propriety of a state's initial jurisdiction depends upon
its conformity with the UCCJA of that state. Therefore, whether the issue is
initial, enforcement, or modification jurisdiction, the first inquiry is whether
assumption of initial jurisdiction was proper under the UCCJA. This implies
a full application of the UCCJA, not merely facial conformity with one of the
enumerated grounds for jurisdiction 9 If jurisdiction was not proper, then
the custody decree is not entitled to full faith and credit under the PKPA.5"
Ifjurisdiction was properly invoked, then the second requirement of the PKPA

41. Because child custody issues must be brought in state court, intitial jurisdiction must be
proper under state law. It is not necessary to analyze jurisdiction under the PKPA until more

than one state is competing for jurisdiciton.

42. This would occur if both parents moved from the state which rendered the initial
custody decree. Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 223.

43. A court may decline jurisdiction pursuant to the inconvenient forum provision of the
UCCJA. See infra note 77; see also Bodenheimer, supranote 3, at 222.
44. See, e.g., CAL. CPvL CODE § 5162 (West 1983); Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.500 (1986).
45. See, e.g., CAL. CvIL CODE § 5163 (West 1983); Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.505 (1986).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (1988); Mancusi v. Mancusi, 519 N.Y.S.2d 476, 478 (Fain. Ct.
1987).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c) (1988).
48. Id § 1738A(c)(1).
49. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(1) (1988) provides: "such court has jurisdiction under the
law of such state." A court must fully conform with its state's version of the UCCJA to have
jurisdiction under state law; it follows that the PKPA requires a full analysis of state law to meet
this requirement.
50. Id. § 1738A(a), (c)(1).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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becomes relevant, namely that jurisdiction be based upon one of the grounds

authorized in the PKPA. 5" Thus, if both requirements are successfully met,
the initial custody decree will be entitled to full faith and credit.52 If they
are not, however, a court may modify the initial decree provided it has
jurisdiction pursuant to the UCCJA of the state in which it sits.
A. Uniform Child Custody JurisdictionAct
1. Historical Need
Prior to 1968, the year the UCCJA was promulgated,53 there was not a
national system to insure that the child custody decrees of one state would be
recognized and enforced in another state. The Full Faith and Credit Clause 4
only requires states to enforce judgments of sister states with equal force as
they would enforce their own.55 Because states have the power to modify
their own custody decrees, the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not bar them
from modifying custody decrees of other states.56
The possibility of obtaining a favorable custody decree in an alternate
state provides an immense incentive for parents to kidnap their children and
move them from state to state until they find a sympathetic judge.57 With
an increase in the divorce rate and social mobility," the jurisdictional
incentive for parental kidnapping has been widely recognized. The estimated
yearly number of parental kidnapping incidents hovers somewhere between
25,000 and 100,000.i Because children are particularly vulnerable and their
"fate is ultimately connected with the fortunes of the litigants," there was a
dire need for states to promulgate jurisdictional rules in child custody matters
"emphasizing restraint and comity in order to minimize potential conflicts and
harm to children."' In response to this need, the UCCJA was formed and
eventually adopted by all fifty states.61

51. These requirements are discussed infra part I.C.

52. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (1988).
53. Atwood, supranote 6, at 389.
54. U.S. CONST art. IV, § 1.

55. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 180 (1988).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Kruger, supra note 39, at 467.
59. Thompson, 484 U.S. at 181; ChristopherL. Blakesley, ChildCustody-Jurisdictionand
Procedure,35 EMoRY L.J. 291, 296 (1986).
60. Blakesley, supra note 59, at 294.
61. Kruger, supranote 39, at 470. Missouri adopted its version of the UCCJA in 1978 by
L. 1978, H.R. 914, at 689, § 1. California adopted its version of the UCCJA in 1973 by Stats.
1973, ch. 693, at 1251, § 1.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss2/6
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2. Promulgation of the UCCJA

By providing a uniform, nationwide system for custody determinations,
the drafters of the UCCJA hoped to promote stability and consistency in the
lives of children following a breakup of the family unit.62 To accomplish
this purpose, the UCCJA "had to bestow legal effect upon that continuing
jurisdiction which operates beyond the state borders.,6 3 Most states made at
least minimal modifications to the UCCJA before codifying it.' However,
the two statutory adaptations in Glanzner,the California and Missouri versions

of the UCCJA, are substantially similar. They provide authority for assuming
initial or modification jurisdiction65 in each of four situations: (1) the state
is the child's home state;' (2) the child and at least one litigant have

significant connection with the state; (3) the child is physically present in the
state and has been abandoned, abused or neglected; or (4) no other state has
jurisdiction under the first three grounds and/or another state has declined
jurisdiction because it is in the child's best interest for this state to litigate the
child custody issue.67

62.
63.
64.
65.

Kruger, supra note 39, at 470.
Id
Atwood, supra note 6, at 391.
Modification jurisdiction vests a court with power to change an initial custody decree.

66. "Home State" is defined by § 452.445(4) of the Missouri UCCJA as

the state in which, immediately preceding the filing of child custody proceeding, the
child lived with his parents, a parent, an institution; or a person acting as parent, for
at least six consecutive months; or, in the case of a child less than six months old,
the state in which the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned.
Periods of temporary absence of any of the named persons are counted as part of the
six-month or other period.
Mo. REV.STAT. § 452.445(4) (1986).
California adheres to a substantially similar definition of "Home State." CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 5151(5) (West 1983).
67. Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.450 (1986). The Missouri UCCJA establishes the follbwing
grounds for jurisdiction:
1. A court of this state which is competent to decide child custody matters has
jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification decree
if:
(1) This state:
(a) Is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of the proceeding; or
(b) Had been the child's home state within six months
before commencement of the proceeding and the child is
absent from this state for any reason, and a parent or person
acting as parent continues to live in this state; or
(2) It is in the best interest of the child that a court of this state assume
jurisdiction because:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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The UCCJA establishes more than one legitimate ground to assume initial
jurisdiction.68 When two or more states have a legitimate claim to initial
jurisdiction under the UCCJA, the Act sets out guidelines to determine which
court is the proper forum.69 The UCCJA requires parties in a custody
proceeding to divulge information concerning all past or present custody
proceedings in which the child has been involved.7" It also places an
affirmative duty upon courts to consult the child custody registry to determine
if an action concerning the issue is pending in another state."' If a court
becomes aware of a pending action in another state, the UCCJA directs the
courts to communicate with each other to determine which forum is most
appropriate for the present litigation.72 However, if the courts do not agree
on an appropriate forum, the.legally-mandated forum is the court in which the
custody action was first pending. 3

(a) The child and his parents, or the child and at least one
litigant, have a significant connection with this state; and
(b) There is available in this state substantial evidence
concerning the child's present or future care, protection,
training, and personal relationships; or

(3) The child is physically present in this state and:
(a) The child has been abandoned; or'
(b) It is necessary in an emergency to protect the child
because he has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse, or is otherwise being neglected; or
(4) It appears thatno other state would have jurisdiction under prerequisites substantially in accordance with subdivision (1), (2), or (3), or
another state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this
state is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the
child, and it is in the best interest of the child that this court assume
jurisdiction.
Id.
The main difference between the California and the Missouri UCCJA jurisdictional
provisions is the grammatical style each uses to achieve substantive equality between the four
possible grounds for obtaining jurisdiction. Missouri achieves this end by connecting each
ground with an "or." California does not use the "or" connector, but rather achieves the same
result by establishing in the first paragraph that jurisdiction exists "if the conditions as set forth
in any of the following paragraphs are met" CAL. CIV. CODE § 5152(1) (West 1983); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 452.450 (1986).
68. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5152(1) (West 1983); Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.450 (1986).
69. Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 216-17.
70. CAL. Cirv. CODE § 5158 (West 1983); Mo. REv.STAT. § 452.480 (1986).
71. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5155 (West 1983); Mo. REv.STAT. § 452.465 (1986).
72. CAL. Cirv. CODE § 5155 (West 1983); Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.465 (1986).
73. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5155 (West 1983); Mo. REv.STAT. § 452.465 (1986); Wachter v.
Wachter, 439 So. 2d 1260, 1265 (La. Ct.App. 1983); Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 213.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss2/6
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3. Does the UCCJA Contain a Home State Preference?
While a strict reading of the UCCJA provides no implication of a home
state preference, some courts have interpreted a preference for home state
jurisdiction into the Act.74 One commentator has argued that when a
preference for home state jurisdiction is erroneously interpreted into the
UCCJA,
The noxious effects of the concurrent jurisdiction idea are compounded.
The state of the custody judgment would lack even concurrent jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction would shift whenever the child spent six months in another
state, regardless of the circumstances of the move. A kidnapping parent
during that period,
would simply wait six months, perhaps hiding the child
75
and could then relitigate custody in the new forum.
The promulgators of the UCCJA carefully drafted procedures to avoid
conflicts in concurrentjurisdiction. The Louisiana Supreme Court expounded
on the procedural logic of the UCCJA:
It is evident that jurisdiction may exist in two different states under the
home state and significant connection standards. When this occurs, it is not
necessary that the significant connection state defer in every case to the
home state. The conflict is avoided by reference76to priority of filing and
to factors indicating... an inconvenient forum.
Courts that have legitimate jurisdiction under one of the four jurisdictional grounds provided by the UCCJA are allowed to decline jurisdiction if they
determine, sua sponte or upon a motion by a representative of the child, that
it would be in the best interest of the child for an alternate forum to determine
custody.77 Some states enumerate specific factors a court may look at when

considering whether it isin the best interest of the child for that state to retain
or decline jurisdiction. In Hattoum v. Hattoum,78 the court noted that
Pennsylvania's UCCJA allows a court to consider, inter alia, "[i]f another state

is or recently was the home state of the child. 79 While this may be an
enumerated consideration in some states' versions of the UCCJA, it is still
74. Glanzner v. Glazner, 835 S.W.2d 380, 392 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
75. Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 220.
76. Revere v. Revere, 389 So. 2d 1277, 1280 (La. 1980).
77. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5156 (West 1983); Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.470 (1986).
78. 441 A.2d 403 (Pa. 1982).
79. Ia at 406. California provides an identical provision for consideration in determining
whether a court should decline jurisdiction. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5156(3)(a) (West 1983).
Missouri's UCCJA does not enumerate factors to be considered in determining whether or not
a forum is inconvenient.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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merely a single factor among many, and as such is inconclusive on the issue
of which forum should exercise jurisdiction."
Although a state may decline legitimatejurisdiction based on inconvenient
forum considerations, it is not mandatory to do so.8' However, "unless a

state has continuing jurisdiction under the terms of the federal law, the PKPA
makes it judicially imprudent for one state court to exercisejursidiction when
another state court fulfills the requirements and wishes to exercise 'home
state' jurisdiction." 2 There is a trend among states to decline jurisdiction in
order to allow the home state to litigate the issue. 3 However, Professor
Bodenheimer, a reporter for the committee that drafted the UCCJA, s4 warns
against adopting this trend as a hard and fast rule.85 In support of her
admonition against judicial creation of a home state preference in the UCCJA,
she points to circumstances where declining jurisdiction in favor of the home
state may work to the disadvantage of the child; for example, when the home
state has a tendency to abolish the noncustodial parent's visitation rights.86

4. The UCCJA Is Designed to Eliminate Conflicting
Child Custody Decrees Among States
The Act provides that a state may not modify a custody decree rendered
by a sister state that assumed initial jurisdiction in substantial conformity with
the UCCJA."7 This provision confers exclusive continuing jurisdiction to the
state rendering the initial decree unless (1) that state no longer has jurisdiction
in substantial conformity with the UCCJA88 or (2) it declines to exercise
continuing jurisdiction. 9 Theoretically, the UCCJA provides for no instances
of concurrent jurisdiction.' However, this theory assumes that judges will
uniformly apply the UCCJA and will interpret the law of another state
consistent with that state's interpretation of its own UCCJA. Professor

80. Hattoum, 441 A.2d at 406.
81. Mancusi, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 478.
82. Id. at 478-79 (citation omitted).
83. Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 222.
84. Kruger, supra note 39, at 469.
85. Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 222-23.
86. Id.
87. UCCJA § 14; see CAL. CIV. CODE § 5163 (West 1983); Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.505
(1986).
88. This would occur if both parents moved from the state that rendered the initial custody
decree. Bodenheimer, supra note 3,at 224.
89. A court may decline jurisdiction pursuant to the inconvenient forum provision of the
UCCJA. See supra note 77; see also Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 222.
90. Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 216.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss2/6
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Bodenheimer, interpreting the Commissioners' Note to Section 6 of the
UCCJA,9' elaborates on the intended effect of the Act: "only one state-the
state of continuing jurisdiction-has power to modify the custody decree.
Only that state decides whether to decline the exercise of its jurisdiction in any
particular case. The rule is clear and simple. There can be no concurrent
jurisdiction and no jurisdictional conflict between two states." 92 Although
eliminating concurrent jurisdiction was the intent of the UCCJA, many
jurisdictional conflicts between states have arisen, due primarily to inconsistent
interpretations of various modified adaptations of the UCCJA.
To prevent courts from exercising simultaneous jurisdiction where more
than one forum has legitimate jurisdiction pursuant to the UCCJA, the Act
provides that jurisdiction rightfully vests in the court in which the action was
first pending. 3 The Missouri version of the UCCJA reads: "A court of this

state shall not exercise its jurisdiction under [the UCCJA] if, at the time of
filing the petition, a proceeding concerning the custody of the child was
pending in a court of another state exercising jurisdiction substantially in
conformity with [the UCCJA], unless the proceeding is stayed by the court of
that other state for any reason."' In In re Marriageof Ray,95 the Missouri
Court of Appeals noted that substantial conformity may be achieved by
obtaining jurisdiction under any of the four jurisdictional grounds provided in
the UCCJA, without recognition of a home state preference.96
Courts sometimes misapply the continuing exclusive jurisdiction aspect
of the UCCJA. If continuing exclusive jurisdiction is properly applied, the

91. The Missouriand Californiaversions ofsection 6 are entitled "Simultaneous Proceedings
in Other States" and are in substantial conformity with the model code. See CAL. CIVIL CODE
§ 5155 (West 1983); Mo. REv. STAT. § 452A65 (1986).
92. Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 216.
93. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5155 (West 1983); Mo. REV. STAT. § 452A65 (1986).
94. Mo. REy. STAT. § 452.465.1 (1986).
95. 820 S.W.2d 341 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
96. Id. at 344. Other states with statutory provisions similar to that of Missouri have
declined to exercise jurisdiction when custody litigation was pending in another state exercising
jurisdiction in substantial conformity with the UCCJA. In re Custody of Rector, 565 P.2d 950
(Colo. Ct. App. 1977); Wachter v. Wachter, 439 So. 2d 1260 (La. Ct. App. 1983); In re
McDonald, 253 N.W.2d 678 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977); De Passe v. De Passe, 70 A.2d 473 (N.Y.
1979).
For example, in Wachter v. Wachter, 439 So. 2d 1260 (La. Ct. App. 1983), the Lousisiana
Court of Appeals held that Louisiana was not entitled to exercise jurisdiction over a child custody
determination because the issue was pending in a New Jersey court when the Louisiana court
initiated jurisdiction. Id at 1264-65. At the time the Louisiana court initiated jurisdiction, the
New Jersey court's exercise ofjurisdiction was in substantial compliance with the UCCJA. Id.
at 1265. The New Jersey court, however, did not maintain consistency with the UCCJA
throughout the proceeding because it failed to comply with its notice requirements. Id. at 1264.
The New Jersey action, therefore, was not enforceable under either the UCCJA or the PKPA.
Id. at 1265.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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court will have to apply only the UCCJA provisions on simultaneous
proceedings and pending actions in two circumstances: (1) to determine initial
jurisdiction, or (2) in one of the two situations where a court may lose
continuing jurisdiction.'
In Hempe v. Cape,9" the Missouri Court of
Appeals, Southern District, erroneously applied the simultaneous proceedings
and pending actions provision when neither of the circumstances warranting
their application was present. The Hempe court declined to exercise
jurisdiction over a child custody modification proceeding because an action
concerning the issue was pending in a Florida court that the Hempe court
determined was exercising jurisdiction in substantial conformity with the
UCCJA." The initial custody decree was entered in Missouri, which was the
child's home state at that time."° However, because the father still resided
in Missouri, when the later Florida action for modification was brought,
Missouri maintained exclusive continuing jurisdiction under both the Missouri
and Florida versions of the UCCJA.' ° As such, the Florida court should
have recognized Missouri's exclusive continuing jurisdiction and deferred to
it for the judgment on modification."° Because the Florida court assumed
jurisdiction in contravention of its own state law, only the determination of the
Missouri court was entitled to full faith and credit under the PKPA.' 3
The UCCJA attempts to achieve its purpose of consistent custody decrees
by affirmatively requiring states to enforce decrees of other states rendered in
accordance with the UCCJA.' ° Both the California and Missouri enactments of the UCCJA require enforcement of custody decrees of sister states
made in accordance with the UCCJA in the same manner that a court of each
state would enforce a decree of its own state. 05

97. Bodenheimer, supranote 3, at 218; see also supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
98. 702 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
99. Id at 161.
100. Id. at 153.

101. FLA. STAT. ch. 61.1328 (1985); Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.505 (1986).
102. FLA. STAT. ch. 61.1328 (1985); Mo. REv. STAY. § 452.505 (1986).
103. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d) (1988). The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, discussed
infa, governs jurisdiction in enforcement and modification decrees. The PKPA requires that

jurisdiction be proper under state law in order for a custody decree to be enforceable. Id.
104. Atwood, supra note 6, at 391.
105. CAL. CiV. CODE § 5162 (West 1983); Mo. REv. STAT.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss2/6
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B. ParentalKidnappingPrevention Act
1. Historical Need
Many of the problems giving rise to the UCCJA continued to exist after
its promulgation because of widespread state modifications and differing
interpretations of the model UCCJA.' In Thompson v. Thompson, 7 the
United States Supreme Court opined that the UCCJA "floundered" because
states adopted variant versions of the Act." 8 Another primary reason the
UCCJA has failed to prevent inconsistent custody determinations is that judges
often interpreted statutes of other states inconsistently with the forum state's
interpretation of its own statute." 9 Due to concern over these issues and
because "custody orders characteristically are subject to modification as
required by the best interests of the child... some courts doubted whether
custody orders were sufficiently 'final' to trigger full faith and credit
requirements."' 0
The continued occurence of inconsistent custody
determinations and concern for the well being of children led Congress to
enact the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA)," which became
effective in 1981."'

2. Provisions of the PKPA
The PKPA governs jurisdiction of custody enforcement and modification
proceedings."' The Act requires that when a custody proceeding is brought
in a state other than the state that rendered the initial decree, the "State [in
which the action is subsequently brought] shall enforce according to its terms,
and shall not modify except as provided [herein], any child custody determination made consistently with the provisions of this section by a court of another
State."" 4 Custody determinations are consistent with the PKPA when
jurisdiction is exercised in conformity with the laws of that state and one of
the following is met: (1) the state is the child's home state; (2) there is no
home state and the child and at least one contestant have significant connection with the state; (3) the child is physically present in the state and has been

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Atwood, supra note 6, at 391.
484 U.S. 174 (1988).
Id. at 181.
Peter M. Walzer, ManeuveringThrough Complex Rules, 12 FAM. ADvoc. 16 (1990).
Thompson, 484 U.S. at 180.
28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1988).
28 U.S.C. § 1738A note (1988) (explaining Congress' purpose for enacting the PKPA).
Mancusi, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 478.
28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (1988).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

13

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 6
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 58

abandoned, abused, or neglected; (4) no state has jurisdiction pursuant to the

PKPA; (5) a state has declined jurisdiction because it is in the child's best
interest that this state decide the child custody
issue; or (6) the state has
6
continuing jurisdiction.. under the PKPA."

Other than the difference in the types of custody proceedings over which
the PKPA and UCCJA govern jurisdiction, perhaps the key difference between
115. The PKPA also contains a provision granting continuingjurisdiction to the court which
enters the initial custody decree provided jurisdiction was based on grounds consistent with the
PKPA. A court maintains continuing jurisdiction as long as that jurisdiction is consistent with
its own laws and at least one contestant remains a resident of the state in which the court sits.
116. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1988). The PKPA provides:
(c) A child custody determination made by a court of a State is consistent with the
provisions of this section only if(1) such court has jurisdiction under the law of such State; and
(2) one of the following conditions is met:
(A) such State (i) is the home State of the child on the date
of the commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had been
the child's home State within six months before the date of
the commencement ofthe proceeding and the child is absent
from such State because of his removal or retention by a
contestant or for other reasons, and a contestant continues
to live in such State;
(B)(i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction
under subparagraph (A), and (ii) it is in the best interest of
the child that a court of such State assume jurisdiction
because (I) the child and his parents, or the child and at
least one contestant, have a significant connection with such
State other than mere physical presence in such State, and
(I) there is available in such State substantial evidence
concerning the child's present or future care, protection,
training, and personal relationships;
(C) the child is physically present in such State and (i) the
child has been abandoned, or (ii) it is necessary in an
emergency to protect the child because he has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse;
(D)(i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction
under subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (E), or another State
has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that the

State whose jurisdiction is in issue is the more appropriate
forum to determine the custody of the child, and (ii) it is in
the best interest of the child that such court assume jurisdiction; or
(E) the court has continuing jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (d) of this section.
(d) The jurisdiction of a court of a State which has made a child custody determination consistently with the provisions of this section continues as long as the
requirement of subsection (c)(1) of this section continues to be met and such State
remains the residence of the child or of any contestant.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss2/6
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the Acts is that the PKPA contains a home state preference." 7 Under the
UCCJA, "a state may exercise significant connection jurisdiction even if a
home state ... exists at the same time. In contrast, the PKPA authorizes
'significant connection' jurisdiction only when there is no state qualifying as
the child's home state."" 8 As a result custody decrees made in a state
exercising significant connection jurisdiction when a home state exists will be
consistent with the requirements of the UCCJA but not with those of the
PKPA. 119
3. The PKPA Incorporates the UCCJA
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the PKPA was
intended to incorporate, not eliminate, the UCCJA.'2 The Court explained
that "[t]he sponsors and supporters of the [PKPA] continually indicated that
the purpose of the PKPA was to provide for nationwide enforcement of

custody orders made in accordance with the terms of the UCCJA." ' The
incorporation of the UCCJA is textually embodied in the first of two
requirements for jurisdiction under the PKPA: "such court has jurisdiction
under the law of such State."'" If jurisdiction is inconsistent with a state's
own law (normally embodied in that state's UCCJA) then jurisdiction fails the
PKPA test; a decree rendered inconsistently with that state's UCCJA is not
entitled to full faith and credit under the PKPA.'
The Supreme Court
noted that congressional intent in promulgating the PKPA was to effectively
adopt "key provisions of the UCCJA for all states" to eliminate incentives for
forum shopping. 24 Because initial jurisdiction is wholly controlled by state
law, and because the PKPA applies only to situations in which a previous
decree has been rendered, courts generally accept that the PKPA was meant
to work in conjunction with state law and not override it."2
In Wachter v. Wachter, 6 the Louisiana Court of Appeals strictly
applied a PKPA analysis, articulating the analytical framework courts should
use in determining whether a custody determination is entitled to full faith and
credit. Because the PKPA requires custody decrees to be consistent with the

117.
Ct. App.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(B) (1988); O'Daniel v. Walker, 686 S.W.2d 805, 806 (Ark.
1985); Mancusi, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 478.
Atwood, supra note 6, at 392,
Id.
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 181 (1988).
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(1) (1988).
See Wachter v. Wachter, 439 So. 2d 1260, 1264-65 "(La.Ct App. 1983).
Thompson, 484 U.S. at 182.
Blakesley, supra note 59, at 350-52.
439 So. 2d 1260 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
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law of the state where rendered, the court analyzed the initial custody decree,
rendered in New Jersey, under New Jersey's UCCJA. 7 Even though New
Jersey qualified as the home state," the New Jersey decree was not entitled
to full faith and credit under the PKPA because the court failed to comply
In other words,
with the notice requirement of the New Jersey UCCJA.
because jurisdiction was improper under New Jersey's UCCJA, it was ipso
facto improper under the PKPA.' 3 °
Another example of the interaction between the UCCJA and the PKPA
is found in Bolger v. Bolger.3 ' In that case, a custody proceeding was
pending in Texas when New York assumed jurisdiction over the same
.issue.1 The New York UCCJA required a court to stay proceedings if an
action was pending in another court exercising jurisdiction in substantial
However, the Texas court assumed
conformity with the UCCJA.
jurisdiction based solely on the physical presence of the children in Texas at
the time the action was brought.'34 This basis for jurisdiction was
specifically denied in the UCCJA.'35 Therefore, New York's assumption of
jurisdiction was not in contravention of its own law. Although the Texas
Court of Appeals did not specifically delineate its rationale for finding the
New York decree consistent with New York's laws, the court did recognize
this requirement.'36 The Texas court found the initial jurisdiction consistent
with the requirements of the PKPA and thus determined that the New York
decree was entitled to full faith and credit.'37
4. The PKPA Does Not Pre-empt the UCCJA
The PKPA is designed to incorporate rather than pre-empt the UCCJA
To
and to enhance its purpose of avoiding inconsistent custody decrees.'
enactment
pre-empts
state
family
law,
the
determine that a congressional

127. Id. at 1264.
128. Id. at 1265.
129. Id. at 1264.
130. Hempe v. Cape, 702 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). In both Hempe and Wachter
assumption of jurisdiction was improper under the UCCJA of the state assuming jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the PKPA precludes the application of full faith and credit to such custody decrees.
The Wachter court recognized this mandate of federal law, while the Hempe court did not.
131. 678 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984).
132. Id at 195.
133. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 75-g.1 (McKinney 1988).
134. See Bolger, 678 S.W.2d at 196.
135. N.Y. DOM. F.L. LAW § 75-d.2 (McKinney 1988).
136. Bolger, 678 S.W.2d at 196.
137. Id.
138. See supranotes 120-25 and accompanying text.
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United States Supreme Court requires a finding that "Congress has positively
required by direct enactment that state law be preempted."' 39 Alternatively,
state family law may be pre-empted under the Supremacy Clause 4 ' if the
law does "'major damage' to 'clear and substantial' federal interests."141 In
Archambault v. Archambault, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts concluded, "[firom the language of the PKPA ... Congress did not
intend expressly to preempt any state law."'4 However, the Archambault
court did find that the Supremacy Clause mandated pre-emption of an
amendment to the Massachusetts UCCJA because it frustrated the purposes of
the PKPA.'"
The Glanzner court cited Marks v. Marks"45 for the proposition that the
PKPA pre-empts the UCCJA. 4 In Marks, however, the South Carolina
Court of Appeals failed to determine whether the "public policy of the
[UCCJA] should also be applied" in applying the PKPA to determine a
custody enforcement action. 47 The Marks court reasoned that the PKPA
governed the issue because it was enacted at the time the action was
commenced, whereas South Carolina's UCCJA was not enacted until later. 48
In analyzing the issue consistently with the PKPA, the court determined that
jurisdiction was proper pursuant to the laws of the state that rendered the
initial custody decree. 49 Because the UCCJA was not enacted in South
Carolina at the time Marks was initiated, it could not be inferred that South
Carolina's reliance on the PKPA indicated pre-emption of the UCCJA.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals, in Voninski v. Voninski, 50 provided

139. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572,581 (1979) (quoting Wetmorev. Markoe, 196

U.S. 68, 77 (1904)).
140. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368 (1986).
141. Id. (quoting United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966)).
142. 555 N.E.2d 201 (Mass. 1990).
143. Id at 205.
144. Id at 208. The Massachusetts UCCJA amendment contained a provision not
commonly found in the UCCJA of other states and not contained in the model draft of the
UCCJA. The 1987 amendment to MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209B, § 1l(b) provides: 'Notwithstanding
any provision of this chapter to the contrary, no child shall be ordered or compelled to appear
or attend [a custody] proceeding in another state when, after a hearing ajudge makes a finding
that there is probable cause to believe that such child may be placed in jeopardy or exposed to
risk of mental or physical harm by such return to said other state." Archambault, 555 N.E.2d
at 204.
145. 315 S.E.2d 158 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984).
146. Glanzner, 835 S.W.2d at 392.
147. Marks, 315 S.E.2d at 160.
148. Id
149. Id at 161.
150. 661 S.W.2d 872 (Tenn. CL App. 1982). The court applied the Tennessee and New
York UCCJAs to determine if the exercise ofjurisdiction was consistent with the state law. Id
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insight into the conceptual framework of the UCCJA and PKPA. The court
explained that
[u]nder the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, the PKPA
takes precedence over either the Tennessee or New York law and must be
first consulted in determining jurisdiction in custody disputes... In this
judicial maze, the federal act, however, directs one straight back to state
law since the first ofthe jurisdictional prerequisites of the
PKPA is that the
5
state court must have jurisdiction under its own laws.' '
In aiy PKPA analysis, proper application of a state's UCCJA is essential to
arriving at the mandated result. The Acts are complimentary, not competitive
or mutually exclusive.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Glanzn'er v. Glanzner,"52
' the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern
District, held that the California court order granting custody of Bradley
Glanzner to his mother, Suzanne, was not entitled to full faith and credit under
the PKPA and was therefore not enforceable in Missouri.'53 The court
focused its inquiry on determining which of the conflicting decrees was
entitled to enforcement."s
The court first addressed the validity of the California court's initial
assumption of jurisdiction. The court explained that because the PKPA is
silent on the issue, analysis of initial jurisdiction must focus on the jurisdictional provisions of the UCCJA."5' Both the California and Missouri
adaptations of the UCCJA confer authority to exercise initial jurisdiction on

a state where (1) the child and at least one parent have "significant connections" with the state and (2) substantial evidence concerning the child's present
or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships is available in
the state." 6 Based upon this provision, the court upheld the California trial

151. Id. at 876 (citations omitted).
152. 835 S.W.2d 386 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
153. Id at 391. Judge Grimm delivered the opinion ofthe court, with ChiefJudge Gaertner
and Judge Simon concurring. Id at 387, 394.

154. Id. at 390.
155. Id. at 389. The official title of the PKPA is 'Full faith and credit given to child
custody determinations." 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1988). The PKPA governs only enforcement and
modification of foreign decrees. Id.
156. CAL. Civ. CoDE § 5152(1)(b) (West Supp. 1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.450.1(2)

(1986).
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court's initial assumption of jurisdiction as proper under the UCCJA.' sT The
Glanzner court also noted that the PKPA did not pre-empt the California
UCCJA provision for initial jurisdiction."' 8
The court next determined that the Missouri trial court's exercise of
jurisdiction over the custody issue pending in California was also proper under
the UCCJA. 5 9 Under Missouri Revised Statute section 452.450.1(a) and
(b), a court is entitled to exercise jurisdiction if it is the home state"6 at the
time proceedings are commenced or had been the home state within six
months prior to the commencment of proceedings. 6 ' Because Bradley, after
a nine month stay in Missouri, had only been absent two months when
Suzanne initiated custody proceedings, and three months when Keith initiated
custody proceedings, the court reasoned that Missouri was the home state.'62
The court further determined that because Missouri was the home state, it was

the proper forum to determine the child custody issue.163

157. Glanzner, 835 S.W.2d at 389-90. Keith Glanzner asserted that California was an
improper forum because it lacked personal jurisdiction over him. After he was personally served,
he made a motion to quash service. However, his ground for that motion was that California
should not exercise jurisdiction over the child custody issue. The father never made a "special
or limited" appearance for the purpose of asserting that California lacked personal jurisdiction
over him. To the contrary, he acknowledged that he was personally served. This, together with
his general appearance contesting jurisdiction, was sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.
Id. (quoting CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 410.50(a) (West 1983)). In California, when a defendant
fails to make a "special or limited" appearance to contest personal jurisdiction, he waives the
right to later assert that defense. Id. (citing California Dental Ass'n v. American Dental Ass'n,
590 P.2d 401, 404 (Cal. 1979) (en banc)).
158. Glanzner, 835 S.W.2d at 389.
159. Id. at 390.
160. "Home State" is similarly defined in the PKPA, California UCCJA and Missouri
UCCJA as the state in which, immediately preceding the initiation of custody proceedings, the
child lived with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as a parent, for at least six consecutive
months. Periods of temporary absence of any such persons are counted aspart of the six month
period. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(4) (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 5151(5) (West 1983); Mo. REv.
STAT. § 452.445(4) (1986).
161. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(A) (1988) and CAL. CIrv. CODE § 5152(a)(1) (West
Supp. 1993) contain substantially similar provisions.
162. Glanzner, 835 S.W.2d at 390.
163. Id. The Missouri court cited Hempe v. Cape, 702 S.W.2d 152, 161 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985) in support of its determination. In Hempe, Missouri was the home state when it assumed
initial jurisdiction of the child custody issue. Florida later became the home state, but Missouri
possibly retained jurisdiction under the "significant connections" test. See Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 452.450.1(2) (1986). A modification action was initiated in Florida, followed by one in
Missouri. The court of appeals held that Missouri improperly assumed continuing jurisdiction
over the child custody issue by entering a modification decree. The court declined to determine
whether Missouri satisfied the "significant connections" test and thereby satisfied the
requirements for continuing jurisdiction under the PKPA. The court instead held that when an
action is pending in a court of another state whose assumption of jurisdiction is in substantial
conformity with the UCCJA, Missouri should decline to exercise jurisdiction. Hempe, 702
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

19

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 6

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

The mother contended that the Missouri trial court had not exercised
jurisdiction consistentwith Missouri Revised Statute section 452.465.1 because
an action was pending in another state exercising jurisdiction substantially in
conformity with the UCCJA when the Missouri court assumed jurisdiction.' 64 However, the court found this argument untenable, focusing on the
The court opined that had their focus been on
PKPA, not the UCCJA.'
ihe UCCJA, this argument would still have been unlikely to succeed, because
several courts have interpreted the UCCJA to contain a preference for home
state jurisdiction." The Glanzner court posited that when there is a home
state whose court is willing to exercise jurisdiction, usurpation of jurisdiction
state may not constitute "substantial conformity" with the
by another
67
UCCJA.1
In support of these contentions, the Glanzner court resorted to an
extrapolation of the policy considerations behind Congress' adoption of the
PKPA from the congressional historical and statutory notes.6' Because it
held that the California decree was unenforceable, the court interpreted
Missouri Revised Statute section 452.465.1 (disqualifying assumption of
jurisdiction for actions pending in other states exercising jurisdiction in
substantial conformity with the UCCJA) to be in accord with the purpose of
the federal statute, and therefore Missouri's initial determination could be held
valid. 69 Having ruled that the Missouri court's exercise of jurisdiction
complied with the requirements of the PKPA, the Glanzner court announced
decree was entitled to full faith and credit under the federal
that the Missouri
0
statute.

17

S.W.2d at 161. Under the PKPA, when the court that made the initial custody order declines
to exercise jurisdiction over the modification proceeding, a court of another state which properly
has jurisdiction may modify the custody decree. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f) (1988).
164. Glanzner, 835 S.W.2d at 392. Section 452.465.1 of the Missouri Revised Statutes

provides: "Acourt of this state shall not exercise its jurisdiction under [the UCCJA] if, at the
time of filing the petition, a proceeding concerning the custody of the child was pending in a
court of another state exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with [the UCCJA], unless
the proceeding is stayed by the court of that other state for any reason." Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 452.465.1 (1986).
165. Glanzer, 835 S.V.2d at 392.
166. Id The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, cited Hattoum v. Hattoum, 441
A.2d 403, 405 (Pa. 1982) and Prickett v. Prickett, 498 So. 2d 1060, 1061 (Fla. Ct. App. 1986)

for this proposition. Glazner, 835 S.W.2d at 392.
167. Glazner, 835 S.W.2d at 392.
168. Id at 393. See supranote 112 for an explanation of these policy considerations.
169. Glazner, 835 S.W.2d at 392. The mother also contended that Missouri did not have

in personam jurisdiction over her because of defective return of service. However, in personam
jurisdiction is unnecessary for dissolution or child custody determinations. Id. at 390 (citing In
re Marriage of Breen, 560 S.W.2d 388, 361 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); In re Marriage of Southard,
733 S.W.2d 867, 868 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)).

170. Id at 391.
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The court expressly recognized that where the PKPA and state law
conflict in interstate custody matters, the PKPA pre-empts state law; the court
implicitly found such a conflict"' The Missouri and California UCCJA
authorize "significant connections" as a ground for initial jurisdiction,
regardless of the existence of a home state. Thus, they are inconsistent with
the PKPA enforcement provision, which authorizes "significant connection"
jurisdiction only in the absence of a home state."
The court thereby
reasoned that the PKPA pre-empts the UCCJA and imposes a home state
preference on state law." The Missouri court implied that there is a home
state preference that acts as a de facto nullification of UCCJA significant
connection jurisdiction when the home state does not decline jurisdiction. 4
The court relied on the PKPA requirements for full faith and credit to
arrive at its final conclusion.' The PKPA mandates that a state give full
faith and credit to the child custody determination of another state when (1)
the court exercising jurisdiction has jurisdiction under the laws of its own state
and (2) jurisdiction is consistent with the PKPA.'76 The court found that
Missouri's petition was consistent with the PKPA because Missouri had been
the child's home state within six months of filing the petition.7 The court
also found that the California petition failed to satisfy any of the enumerated
possibilities to qualify for enforcement under the PKPA.'78 The court thus
denied enforcement of the California custody decree, denied Suzanne's writ
of habeas corpus, and quashed the temporary order granting Suzanne custody
of Bradley.179

171. Id. at 392. The court cited U.S.

CoNsT.

art. I, § 8 for the proposition: "Congressional

enactments which do not expressly exclude state legislation in the field nevertheless override state
laws with which they conflict." Id. (quoting National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp, 687 F.2d
1122, 1128-29 (8th Cir. 1982)).

172. Glazner, 835 S.W.2d at 391.
173. Id. at 391-92.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 391. The PKPA provides that "every State shall enforce ... any child custody
determination made consistently with the [PKPA] by a court of another state." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A(a) (1988).
176. Glanzner,835 SAV.2d at 391. See supranotes 115-16 and accompanying text for the
requirements to be "consistent with" the PKPA.
177. Glanzner, 835 S.W.2d at 391. The' court found that Missouri satisfied 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A(c)(2)(A) (1988). Id.
178. Glanzner,835 S.W.2d at 391.
179. Id at 393.
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V. COMMENT

A. What Went Wrong?
Glanzner v. Glanzner180 exemplifies how a legislature's purpose can be
frustrated by improper application of the law. By rejecting the California
custody decree and upholding the Missouri decree, the Glanzner court's
application of the UCCJA and PKPA encourages the very act that the
legislation intended to prevent: interstate kidnapping designed to gain a
favorable custody determination. 8' The court's holding implicitly gave
legal approval to Keith Glanzner's kidnapping of his son. Either the Acts are
ineffective or they were misapplied in Glanzner.
The Glanzner court was faced with an enforcement action in which two
conflicting original custody decrees had been rendered 8 2 and only one could
be enforced. The first inquiry, therefore, should have been to determine
which court properly exercised initial jurisdiction. The propriety of enforcement inherently rests upon the propriety of the initial jurisdiction. A judgment
rendered by a court exercising improper jurisdiction is void and thereby
unenforceable.'
In considering enforcement, whether one begins with the
PKPA or the UCCJA, attention should immediately be guided to initial
jurisdiction under state law.
In considering the initial assertion of jurisdiction by the California court,
the Missouri Court of Appeals properly determined that the California court
was entitled to exercise initial jurisdiction pursuant to its own UCCJA. The
California court relied on the "significant connection" provision for establishing jurisdiction. From this point on, the Glanzner court's analysis of the law
travels down a path divergent from that intended by the legislature and reaches
an untenable result.
If Keith had been able to locate a forum that had adopted the UCCJA
with sufficient modifications to establish a home state preference in its laws,
or one that did not require enforcement of other states' decrees, it would be
necessary to apply the PKPA to determine the enforceability of the California
decree. As noted earlier, the California decree was inconsistent with the
PKPA and, as such, not entitled to full faith and credit under a PKPA
analysis.'
However, this does not negate the validity of California
exercising initial jurisdiction under the UCCJA; Congress is not empowered
to determine initial jurisdiction for the states. That is one of the functions of

180. 835 S.W.2d 386 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
181.
182.
183.
184.

See supranotes 57-61, 111 and accompanying text.
Glanzner, 835 S.W.2d at 387.
JACK H. FRiEDENTHAL ET AL., Civil. PROCEDURE § 3.1 (1985).
Glanzner, 835 S.W.2d at 391.
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the UCCJA. Although diametrically opposed to public policy, if Keith found
such a forum, he could have established that forum as the home state by
hiding Bradley for six months. He could have then obtained a custody decree
inconsistent with the California decree but enforceable under the PKPA. To
avoid such a possibility, many courts voluntarily decline legitimate jurisdiction
in favor of the home state. Significant connection jurisdiction may be
preferable when the home state has a tendency to make declarations that the
court finds inconsistent with the child's best interest, such as abolishing
visitation rights of the noncustodial parent. A court must balance the merits

of significant connectionjurisdiction with the possibility that some parents will
find a forum sympathetic to kidnapping parents.
B. The Glanzner CourtAnalysis
The Missouri court should have enforced the California custody decree
under the laws of Missouri, notwithstanding the federal law codified in the
PKPA. The facts at hand required Missouri to look no further than its own
UCCJA and the California court's grounds for initial jurisdiction.
The Glanznercourt focused on which decree was entitled to enforcement
under the PKPA.' 5 By focusing its inquiry in such a manner, the court
concerned itself with an issue not properly before it: the propriety of
extending full faith and credit to the Missouri decree."8 6 The California
decree did not satisfy the second prong of the PKPA test because it was not
the home state when the initial action was commenced and Missouri, the home
state, .was available to adjudicate the issue."' However, the Missouri decree
did not satisfy the first prong of the PKPA test because the California court
found initial jurisdiction under significant connection, as authorized under
Missouri law, prior to the assumption of jurisdiction in Missouri."' The
court properly found that the California decree lacked consistency with the
PKPA and was therefore unenforceable by its terms under a PKPA analysis." 9 Thereafter, the Glanzner court hammered a square peg into a circle
by declaring the Missouri decree enforceable.
The Missouri UCCJA, in Missouri Revised Statute section 452.465.1,
requires the court to stay proceedings that are otherwise proper under the
UCCJA if an action in a court of another state, exercising jurisdiction
consistent with the UCCJA, is pending at the commencement of the Missouri

185. Id. at 390.
186. A Missouri court is not equipped to find its own order entitled to full faith and credit.
This task is left to some foreign jurisdiction whenever enforcement is sought.
187. Glanzner, 835 S.W.2d at 391.

188. Id. at 392.
189. Id. at 393.
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action. This provision is part of the state's law to be considered when
determining the validity of initial jurisdiction. However, when faced with this
section of the UCCJA, the Glanzner court offered two retorts for failing to
apply it. First, the PKPA, not the UCCJA, was the focus of inquiry, so the
Missouri law was irrelevant."9° Second, the court declared that if the
Missouri UCCJA was the focus, it very likely contained a home state
preference.'
Although the court earlier admitted that the PKPA did not
pre-empt the California UCCJA in determining initial jurisdiction,"9 that
logic was not consistently applied to the Missouri UCCJA. The court declared
that the PKPA pre-empted section 452.465.1 of the Missouri UCCJA to the
extent that it demanded a finding that the Missouri trial court's initial exercise
of jurisdiction was improper because of the pending California action. 93
The court claimed reliance on congressional historical and statutory notes to
support this proposition. 94 The Glanzner court reasoned that because the
PKPA contains a home state preference, it necessarily pre-empts state law to
the extent that state law does not contain a home state preference. 9
In its research of the congressional history and statutory notes, the court
overlooked Congress' intent to incorporate the UCCJA into the PKPA. 96
Missouri's assumption of jurisdiction in the initial custody proceeding was
improper under Misssouri law and as such was not "made in accordance with
the terms of the UCCJA." Therefore, the Missouri decree was not entitled to
nationwide enforcement under the PKPA.
Had the Glanzner court applied the UCCJA and PKPA as intended, by
incorporating the UCCJA into its PKPA analysis, the court would have been
compelled to enforce the California decree under Missouri law. Because a
California custody action was pending at the time the Missouri trial court
initially assumed jurisdiction, jurisdiction was improper under section
452.465.1. Although the PKPA mandates interstate enforcement of certain
custody decrees, it does not preclude a state from enforcing other decrees
under the state's own laws. The PKPA is not the sole provision available to
Missouri for enforcement of custody decrees. Rather, the Missouri UCCJA
requires enforcement of custody decrees of other states that are mad6 in
conformity with the UCCJA. 1 7 Because the California decree was made in

190. Id. at 392.

191. Id.
192. Id. at 389.
193. Id. at 392.
194. Id at 393.

195. Id. at 392-93.
196. The United States Supreme Court, in Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 181
(1988), noted that "the purpose of the PKPA was to provide for nationwide enforcement of
custody orders made in accordance with the terms of the UCCJA." Id. at 181.
197. Mo. REv.STAT. § 452.505 (1986).
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conformity with the Missouri UCCJA (absent an improper finding of a home
state preference in the UCCJA), the Glanznercourt should have enforced the
California custody decree under the Missouri UCCJA. The Glanzner court
incorrectly interpreted the PKPA to pre-empt the UCCJA on this issue.
In short, the court correctly found that the California decree was not
entitled to full faith and credit under the PKPA. However, it should have

applied the Missouri UCCJA, not the PKPA, and enforced the California
decree under Missouri's state law. Finally, the Glanznercourt's opinion that
the initial Missouri decree was enforceable under the PKPA was incorrect
under the first part of the two-prong PKPA test for determining enforceability.
Had Missouri enforced the California decree under its own law, the legislative
purposes behind the UCCJA and PKPA would have been realized. Keith
Glanzner would have been denied his reward of custody for kidnapping his
son, and Bradley would have been returned to his former and familiar
surroundings with his mother in California.
C. The Home State Preference
The Glanzner court had to work through several statutory loopholes in
order to declare Missouri's decree deserving of full faith and credit. The
Glanzner court first determined that the Missouri trial court's assumption of
jurisdiction was proper under the Missouri UCCJA because Missouri was the
home state.198 It is well established that Missouri was the home state."9
However, in establishing the validity of initial jurisdiction, a court should not
The court
pick and choose which UCCJA provisions to follow.2°1
proper
instrument
to
determine
the
acknowledged that the UCCJA was the
2
propriety of inital jurisdiction. "' It even acknowledged that for the purpose
of determining initial jurisdiction, the PKPA did not pre-empt the California
UCCJA.2° However, it rested its finding that the Missouri decree satisfied
the first prong of the PKPA test on the assumption that the PKPA pre-empts
those portions of the UCCJA that are inconsistent with the home state
preference of the PKPA. °3
The Glanznercourt next asserted that even if the UCCJA was the proper
focus of inquiry to determine whether section 452.465.1 invalidated Missouri's
initial jurisdiction, the Missouri decree was valid because of Missouri's home

198. Glanzner,835 S.W.2d at 390.
199. Id.
200. The PKPA requires jurisdiction to be proper under the laws of the state wherein the
action is proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(1) (1988). To be valid under Missouri law,
jurisdiction must conform with all relevant statutory enactments.

201. Glanzner,835 S.W.2d at 389.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 392.
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state status.2" As explained above, neither the Missouri UCCJA nor the
California UCCJA contain a home state preference. 0 5 While Missouri
courts have voluntarily chosen to decline legitimate jurisdiction under the
UCCJA to allow home states to adjudicate a custody issue,2° the court may
not consistent with Missouri's own statutory provisions, impose this judicial
politeness on California by interpreting a home state preference into their
UCCJA. However, the Glanzner court did just this. By so doing, Glanzner
provided an example of the UCCJA's susceptibility to varying judicial
interpretations from state to state.
The Missouri and California enactments of the UCCJA provide essentially
identical grounds for jurisdiction. 7 The California court interpreted these
grounds to justify significant connection jurisdiction despite the presence of
a home state. The Glanzner Court recognized this interpretation as proper
under the California UCCJA, 2 8 but proceeded to declare that the same
words in the Missouri UCCJA evinced a home state preference.2 9 The
finding of a home state preference mandates denial of initial jurisdiction under
significant connection grounds when a home state exists. The Missouri court,
in effect interpreted California's UCCJA in a manner inconsistent with
California's own interpretation. The Glanznercourt declared that California's
lack of a home state preference rendered its decree not in substantial
conformity with the Missouri UCCJA.210 Therefore, the court reasoned that
the Missouri court was not required to stay proceedings because of the
pending California action.
The court made an incomplete and unpersuasive attempt to dispel the argument that initial jurisdiction in Missouri was
inconsistent with Missouri law. This attempt amounted to judicial legislation
of a home state preference into the Missouri UCCJA.

204. Id
205. See supranotes 74-76 and accompanying text.
206. Hempe v. Cape, 702 S.W.2d 152, 162 (Mo. Ct.App. 1985).
207. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5152 (West 1983); Mo. Rsv. STAT. § 452.450 (1986). See supra
note 67 for the text of Mo Rnv. STAT. § 452.450 (1986).
208. Glanzner,835 S.W.2d at 389.
209. Id. at 392.
210. Id
211. Id

212. Because of the complexity of the UCCJA, courts have occasionally misapplied it and

thereby arrived at faulty conclusions. Prickett v. Prickett, 498 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App,
1986), cited by Glanznerfor asserting that the UCCJA contains a home state preference, is an
example of this. Glanzner, 835 S.W.2d at 392. InPrickett, an initial custody decree was
rendered in Florida, the home state at the time. Prickett, 498 So. 2d at 1061. Thereafter, the

wife and child moved to Connecticut and the father remained in Florida. Id. A later Florida
action modified that decree. Id Subsequently, the wife initiated a custody proceeding in
Connecticut and the Florida Court of Appeals upheld Connecticut's jurisdiction because
Connecticut was now the home state. Id.
at 1062. The Prickett holding is clearly erroneous
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D. Where Are We Now?

Significant connection initial jurisdiction is under attack. This is
unfortunate because it is a carefully devised, sophisticated prong of the
UCCJA. It helps alleviate some of the abuses available where there is a home
state preference.
As a practical matter, custody orders issued from courts that assumed
jurisdiction under the significant connection prong of the UCCJA may face
limited interstate enforcement if the state targeted for enforcement has one of
the following: (1) a mutated UCCJA which fails to provide for interstate
enforcement or which carries a home state preference; or (2) judges who have
judicially mandated a PKPA analysis as a preemptive enforcement mechanism
or have by judicial fiat made a home state preference. This hurdle has caused
some states to decline significant connection jurisdiction in favor of home
state jurisdiction even when otherwise available under the UCCJA.
Conversely, significant connection orders should enjoy interstate
enforcement where the target state has a UCCJA in substantial harmony with
the model code and where its judiciary has not gratuitously mandated a home
state preference or a PKPA preemption.
E. What Needs to Be Done?

Significant legislation in the future is unlikely. The best hope for
avoiding results like that in Glanzner is for the judiciary to rethink the home
state preference and the PKPA preemption. However, if any state is
considering an amended UCCJA, substantial adherence to the model code
would promote consistent custody decrees. In states where the judiciary has
introduced the pernicious doctrines of PKPA preemption or home state
preference, an affirmative legislative repeal of such doctrines is desirable. If
Congress is willing to amend the PKPA, an express requirement of full
adherence to the initial jurisdictional prerequisites of the UCCJA would be of
great benefit. The PKPA and UCCJA are designed to work together and

under both the UCCJA and the PKPA. Connecticut's UCCJA precluded it from modifying the
Florida decree because the Florida-court exercised jurisdiction in substantial conformity to the
Connecticut UCCJA. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-104 (1986). In addition, the PKPA precluded
Connecticut from modifying the Florida decree because Florida maintained continuing
jurisdiction by virtue of three facts: (1)jurisdiction existed under Florida law (Florida properly
assumed jurisdiction pursuant to the Florida UCCJA because it was the home state at the time
of the initial custody decree. FLA. STAT. ch. 61.1308 (1985)), (2) the initial decree was made
consistent with the PKPA because Florida was the home state at the time, (Pricket, 498 So. 2d
at 1061; see supra note 116 for the provisions of the PKPA), and (3) the father remained in
Florida. While Florida had the option of declining jurisdiction in favor of Connecticut, it was
not mandatory. IM.
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supplement each other to insure consistent resolution of custody disputes.
Judicial legislation frustrates these purposes. The PKPA and UCCJA are a
means to an end, a map to arrive at a destination. When the means are
altered, the destination may never be reached.
JULIET A. Cox
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